MURRAY REGIONAL STRATEGY GROUP

Water and food security:

When Government policy risks a nation going hungry

National Food Security Strategy Submission

24 September 2025

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Murray Regional Strategy Group - West Corurgan Private Irrigation, Murray Irrigation Limited, Southern Riverina Irrigators, Rice Growers Association, Murray Valley Private Diverters, Speak Up Campaign

Introduction

Australia's food security now and into the future relies on a sustainable, affordable and diverse home-grown supply. While the three priorities[1] outlined in the National Food Security Strategy discussion paper are relevant, the critical impact of government policy and regulation is conspicuously missing from the priority list.

Governments frequently proclaim support for farmers with initiatives such as this food security strategy. At the same time, their policy levers in planning, taxation and water, to name only a few key portfolio areas, are counterproductive, working in practice to squeeze farm and food manufacturing margins to the point of failure.

In this submission, we focus on how water policy in the Murray-Darling Basin threatens Australia's food security. We identify the areas requiring focused and deep analysis of the supply and affordability risks – areas that federal departments and agencies have so far neglected to take seriously, despite the red flags evident in the data available.

While it is true that government does not control many of the levers of the food system,[2] the national food strategy must prioritise action on those levers governments do control. Broad and deep analysis of all policies and regulations affecting food production is essential to inform a credible and effective national food strategy.

Food production in the Murray-Darling Basin

The Murray-Darling Basin is rightly described as Australia's food bowl. It is home to 40% of all farms in Australia, and produced $30 billion worth of food and fibre in 2020-21, 43% of the $71 billion gross value of Australia's agricultural product in that year.[3]

A substantial proportion, if not the bulk, of food staples essential to Australian food security are grown in the Basin. These support food processing and manufacturing essential to the supply chain bringing these staples to supermarket shelves.

For example, in 2020-21[4]:

- **Rice:** $171 million worth of rice was grown in the Basin, 98% of the $174 million Australian total.

[1] Competition and cost of living; productivity, innovation and economic growth; and, resilient supply chains, p6.
[2] National Food Security Strategy discussion paper, p4.
[3] Value of Agricultural Commodities Produced, Australia 2020-21, https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/industry/agriculture/value-agricultural-commodities-produced-australia/2020-21 Note: 2020-21 was the most recent data we could find: the ABARES Snapshot of Australian Agriculture 2025 did not include a breakdown of the Basin's share of the total $82.4 billion gross value of agricultural production in 2023-24.
[4] *Ibid*.

- **Nuts:** $735 million worth of nuts including almond and macadamias were grown in the Basin, 70% of the $1044 million Australian total.
- **Orchard fruit:** $1921 million worth of fruit (including citrus, cherries, pears, nectarine, peaches, apples, avocadoes, mangoes and olives) were grown in the Basin, 55% of the $3464 million Australia total.
- **Dairy:** $1081 million worth was produced in the Basin, 23% of the $4087 million Australian total.
- **Vegetables:** $949 million worth of vegetables were grown in the Basin in 2020-21, 20% of the Australian total of $4779 million.

These and other food staples rely on irrigation to sustain production, particularly during droughts when many dryland operations have ceased to produce. They therefore require a secure, adequate and affordable water supply.

Any government policies that affect the volume and affordability of water for farmers to grow food, and the supply of that food to processors and manufacturers, have a direct impact on Australia's food security.

Water policy reform in the Murray-Darling Basin.

The 1994 COAG water reform framework recognised an overallocation of surface water for human use water in the Murray-Darling Basin, and froze diversions at 1994 levels.

Since then, a series of reforms including Water for Rivers, The Living Murray and the 2012 Murray-Darling Basin Plan have dramatically reduced the amount of water annually available for irrigated agriculture in the southern-connected Basin through outright water buybacks and on- and off-farm water efficiency projects.

Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) modelling to inform the 2012 Basin Plan estimated an annual average 17,016 GL (one gigalitre (GL) equals one billion litres) of inflows[5], into the southern-connected Basin.[6]

The MDBA model estimated total annual average surface water source diversions for towns, industry and agriculture to be 7993 GL or 47% of the total inflows at the Basin Plan's 2009 baseline.

Agriculture's share of the 47% is difficult to readily calculate as the ABS no longer collects this data, but one pre-Basin Plan estimate says agriculture accounted for 83% of Basin surface water diversions in 2004-05.[7] Applying this metric to the MDBA

[5] Water Resource Assessment for Without Development and Baseline Conditions, MDBA 2011, p47.
[6] Southern-connected Basin includes the NSW Murrumbidgee and Murray valleys, northern Victoria and South Australian Murray catchment. It excludes the non-connected Wimmera and Lachlan river valleys.
[7] ABS Water and the Murray-Darling Basin - A Statistical Profile, 200-01 to 2005-06. https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4610.0.55.007#:~:text=In%202004%2D05%2C%2083%2

modelling in 2011, agriculture in the southern connected Basin diverted an average 6635 GL (83% of 7993 GL) in the Basin Plan's 2009 baseline. Since then, an annual average 1655 GL of water has been recovered from irrigated agriculture, or 25% of the water that was available for growing food and fibre before the Basin Plan.

If pre-Basin Plan water recovery through federal and state programs is included (annual average yield 1067 GL)[8], a total annual average allocation of 2722 GL of water or more than 30% of what used to be available to support irrigated agriculture in the southern Basin) has been redirected for environmental use since the turn of the century.

While this additional water is delivering localised improvements in environmental and ecological health, it is also reducing the volume of water to produce food in key sectors, including rice and dairy. This ultimately undermines national food security when such a large proportion of these staples are grown in the southern Basin.

Given our time and resource constraints as a regional group representing farmers and community in the NSW Murray Valley, it was not possible to do more than this high- level calculation on this policy-driven change in water availability to grow food.

It is essential that government undertakes a deep dive to quantify the change in water availability for growing different commodities in the Murray-Darling Basin, and the impact of upward pressure on water allocation prices on different commodities.

This analysis must also take into account seasonal extremes; in Australia's highly variable climate, annual averages mean nothing. The greatest risk to food security lies in the impact of water availability and affordability during the extremes of flash droughts and prolonged drought, as we will discuss in more detail in the next section.

Water policy red flags for national food security

The discussion paper mentions water only once, to say 'Water security is also crucial to balance risks and opportunities enabling ongoing food availability for domestic consumption and exports.'[9]

We agree.

The question is why the discussion paper provided no more information to actually inform a discussion about whether current water policy settings support a secure and

5,%2D%201%2C252%20GL%20or%2016%25. Note that the ABARES Snapshot of Australian Agriculture 2025 says agriculture accounted for 74% of Australia's water consumption on 2021-22.

[8] Data available from various sources, including Snowy Savings Water Register (NSW), VEWH holdings, OEH holdings, SA environmental water holdings, MDBA table of pre-2009 water recovery.

[9] National Food Security Strategy discussion paper, p10.

affordable water supply to continue growing and processing food in the face of external shocks such as climate and geopolitical tensions?

The experience in the Murray-Darling Basin over the last 25 years demonstrates that government policy has in fact created a less secure and affordable water supply to grow food, particularly during critical dry periods and droughts when irrigated agriculture is the last sector still producing after dryland systems have gone out of production.

Under the 2012 Murray-Darling Basin Plan and earlier federal and state programs this century, a total of 4021 GL (one gigalitre (GL) equals one billion litres) in water entitlements has been recovered in the southern connected Basin through buybacks, and on- and off-farm water efficiency projects. This translates to an additional annual average allocation of 2722 GL of water available to increase flows in rivers, and across wetlands and floodplains.

In December 2023, the Federal Government passed the Restoring our Rivers Act to facilitate the recovery of another annual average 450 GL for the environment, primarily through more entitlement buybacks from farmers, despite the prospect of negligible environmental gain.[10] State reforms under consideration such as the NSW minimum inflows and connectivity projects promise to further reduce water availability and push up water costs for growing food.[11]

Multiple government and other reports have identified how water recovery for the environment impacts the availability and affordability of water to grow different types of food. The impacts will materialise in the next prolonged drought, and pose a very real and likely risk to national food security in the medium to long-term.

These risks need to be taken seriously, and included in the scope for developing of the National Food Security Strategy. In the immediate short term, federal and State governments must cease recovering water from farmers whether through buybacks or rules changes.

Below is a list of key findings from various government and other reports raising red flags about the impacts of water policy on food production, and therefore national food security. It is not a comprehensive list; we would expect the development of the National Food Strategy to compile all relevant impact information.

1. A 2020 ABARES analysis[12] showed that water recovery to date had increased water allocation prices by an annual average of $72/ML (megalitres, or million

[10] NSW Irrigators' council submission to the NSW Parliamentary Inquiry into the Impacts of the Water Amendment (Restoring our Rivers) Act 2023 on NSW regional communities, https://www.nswic.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Impacts-of-the-Water-Amendment-NSWIC-Submission-Final.pdf

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] https://daff.ent.sirsidynix.net.au/client/en_AU/search/asset/1030661/0

litres) over what they would have been otherwise. ABARES found this meant prices would be higher than $200/ML in three out of 10 years.

ABARES modelled the impact of recovering another 450,000 ML, and found it would drive water allocation prices over $200/ML in eight out of 10 years.

Irrigated agriculture in the southern Basin relies heavily on the allocation market to meet its annual water needs and sustain production; dairy, rice and other commodities simply cannot afford to pay allocation prices this high, this often, and stay in business.

2. A 2024 ABARES[13] study showed that an additional 225,000 ML of water recovery would increase annual average water allocation prices by a further $45/ML (10%) (on top of the $72/ML already mentioned).

   ABARES found this scenario would cause $111 million in forgone output in the southern Basin every year, on top of the $542-$764 million in forgone production that the MDBA had estimated to meet the Basin Plan's baseline 2,750,000 ML recovery target.[14] It found these modelled scenarios would hit rice and dairy profitability and production particularly hard.

3. Frontier Economics' modelling of an additional 450,000 ML of water buybacks in the southern Basin[15] showed that $513 million in agricultural output would be forgone per annum. This corresponds to 95,000 ha of irrigated land being dried off across the southern Basin, with an additional 12,400 hectares of high-value horticulture dried off in drought.

   The analysis showed that had no water recovery occurred, water use in northern Victoria's Goulburn Murray Irrigation District (GMID) could be expected to be about 50% higher from 2018-19 to 2021-22. Subsequently, GMID milk production could be expected to have been about 50% higher than observed.

   This finding is supported by Dairy Australia data[16] showing that milk production has steadily declined in northern Victoria compared to the two other Victorian dairy regions in Gippsland and south-west Victoria since 2017, after annual milk production was roughly equivalent in all three regions for many years. Milk production is not increasing elsewhere in Australia to offset the shortfall.

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[13] https://daff.ent.sirsidynix.net.au/client/en_AU/search/asset/1035841/0

[14] https://www.mdba.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/Basin-Plan-RIS-Nov2012.pdf Lower scenario includes estimate of infrastructure investment; higher scenario is direct purchase only for 2750 GL scenario.

[15] https://www.water.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0033/669426/social-and-economic-impacts-of-basin-plan-water-recovery-in-victoria.pdf

[16] Dairy Australia: annual In Focus reports, https://www.dairyaustralia.com.au/en/industry-reports/australian-dairy-industry-in-focus

At the same time, northern Victorian dairy farm expenses are consistently higher, while farm operating cash, earnings before interest and tax and return on total assets are all lower than the other two Victoria dairy regions.[17]

The impact of water policy cannot be minimised in these trends as being only one among many variables affecting production and profitability, and therefore negligible. Murray-Darling Basin dairy farms in northern Victoria/southern NSW are subject to exactly the same market, trade, labour and cost pressures as those in southern Victoria, yet are falling behind on key indicators. The only difference in their operating environment compared with the two southern regions is water policy driving up the price and reducing the security of water supply as a critical input.

4. A 2025 analysis by Ricardo for Dairy Australia[18] found additional water recovery could reduce the water available for growing food in the southern Basin by 7-16%, pushing water allocation prices up by 17-40%. The higher input costs could drive financial losses of more than $430,000 a year for some dairy farms in dry conditions. It would also reduce milk production in the Basin by 3-15%, or 60 to 270 million litres annually.

5. 2020 analysis from Aither[19] suggests that in the lower Murray (Sunraysia and Riverland regions), during periods of extreme dry (similar to 2007-08), water demand from existing perennial horticulture plantings at full maturity (1247 GL) may exceed available water supply within the region (498 GL) by 60%.

   This means that in a repeat of the Millennium Drought, more high value horticulture will have to be dried off than would have been the case if the consumptive pool had not been decreased. This analysis was undertaken before the Federal Government embarked on recovering an additional 450 GL.

6. Chairs and Chief Executive Officers from SunRice, Australian Consolidated Milk, SPC Global and the Australian Dairy Products Federation representing Australian dairy manufacturers appeared at a Senate hearing for the Restoring our Rivers Bill 2023 on 1 November 2023.[20]

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[17] In Focus 2024, Dairy Australia, https://dair-p-001.sitecorecontenthub.cloud/api/public/content/In-Focus-Report-2024?v=22c19907

[18] Impact of water buyback on the sMDB Dairy Industry, 10 June 2025, https://australiandairyfarmers.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Ricardo-Impact-buyback-sMDB-dairy-industry-report.pdf

[19] Southern Murray-Darling Basin water market, Aither, November 2020 https://www.waterregister.vic.gov.au/about/news/330-new-analysis-on-trends-and-drivers-of-water-market-prices-for-allocation

[20] Hansard: Senate Environment and Communications legislation Committee, Water Amendment (Restoring Our Rivers) Bill 2023 Inquiry, 1 November 2023 pp43-47 https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commsen/27385/toc_pdf/Environment%20and%20Communications%20Legislation%20Committee_2023_11_01_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf

> They collectively made it absolutely clear that water recovery was putting food production at risk now and in the future by increasing water costs for farmers and manufacturers, in turn forcing up consumer prices for Australian-grown food, and putting Australian food manufacturing at a competitive disadvantage with cheap food imports. The implications for national food security were clear, and ignored by the Federal Government.

These studies taken together paint a very clear picture: federal and state water recovery past, present and future poses a serious ongoing risk to national food security, with dairy, rice, fruit and vegetables particularly vulnerable. Import substitution is already surging in these and other food staples[21], leaving Australia's food security even more insecure in an unstable geopolitical and climate world.

General

Issues with production value as a food security metric

The ABARES Snapshot of Australian Agriculture 2025 asserts that Australia's agricultural production is growing, on the sole basis that its gross value has increased 34% in the past 20 years in real terms from $61.5 billion in 2004-05 to $82.4 billion in 2023-24.[22]

This metric is problematic, not least because the value has not kept pace with the 67.4% inflation over the same period.[23] This suggest that farmers' margins are being squeezed ever tighter as they absorb the rising cost of inputs with a very limited ability to pass costs onto consumers, particularly amid cost-of-living concerns.

This squeeze does not bode well for sustaining a reliable supply of Australian-grown food, when, for example, a third of Australian vegetable growers are considering leaving the industry due to an ongoing production crisis and lack of farm profitability.[24]

The bottom line is that ABARES' aggregate gross production value of commodities masks critical metrics for assessing food security, including:

- Profitability trends by commodity type broken down into deciles as per the ABARES broadacre graphic below, and also by location.

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[21] Food imports hit $40 billion: local manufacturers struggle to compete, Weekly times, 10 December 2024, https://www.weeklytimesnow.com.au/news/food-imports-hit-40-billion-local-manufacturers-struggle-to-compete/news-story/8b65a9576f4361014f4918738ae67bc5#:~:text=News-,Food%20imports%20hit%20$40%20billion:%20local%20manufacturers%20struggle%20to%20compete,it%20was%20no%20longer%20feasible".

[22] ABARES snapshot of Australian Agriculture 2025, p3.

[23] https://www.rba.gov.au/calculator/financialYearDecimal.html

[24] Relentless margin squeeze threatens vegetable industry, AUSVEG 2025, https://ausveg.com.au/article/relentless-margin-squeeze-threatens-vegetable-industry-viability/p



Profit by farm size, ABARES disaggregated farm performance statistics by size, all broadacre[25]

- Trends in annual volume of production by food type and location.
- Trends in area cultivated or grazed by commodity type and location.
- Gross Value and Production of Irrigated Agriculture by region and commodity.

This type of data collection has been undertaken in some regions (for example: by the Mallee and Goulburn-Brown Catchment Management Authorities in northern Victoria[26]).

It can be expected that the Government and its departments and agencies will say they does not have the time or resources to undertake such granular data collection and analysis. This is a cop-out. If the Government is serious about an effective national food strategy, then this work will be funded as a priority.

Export vs replacement food imports

The ABARES 2025 Snapshot of Australian Agriculture shows Australia exports only a small percentage of its fruit, nuts and rice, pigs, poultry and dairy production.[27] This indicates that the bulk of production is supplying the domestic market.

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[25] Graphic from NSW Water Administration Ministerial Corporation 2025-30 pricing proposal, 30 September 2024, p213, citing ABARES, Disaggregating farm performance statistics by size, accessible from: Disaggregating farm performance statistics by size - DAFF (agriculture.gov.au)

[26] Annual Mallee Catchment Management Authority horticulture crop report, among other information regularly published by the Mallee CMA; and the Goulburn-Broken Catchment Management Authority's Land and Water Use Mapping, https://www.gbcma.vic.gov.au/our-region/sustainable_irrigation/land-and-water-use-mapping.html

[27] ABARES snapshot of Australian Agriculture 2025, p5

At the same time, these commodities feature in the $7 billion surge in cheap food imports over two years to reach almost $40 billion in 2023-24. Notably, recent fruit and vegetable imports jumped 24 per cent, to $3.6bn over the same period, while dairy, sugar, meat and cereal-based products all added to the increase.[28]

Increasing reliance on cheap food imports will accelerate trends in small and medium Australian farms going out of business, and therefore increasing Australia's food security vulnerability in the event of geopolitical tensions, climate and other supply chain shocks here and overseas.

We have already seen this acute risk materialise during the Covid pandemic. Two years of severe drought caused record low production of Australian rice in the southern NSW valleys in the Murray-Darling Basin. Panic buying cleared out the little Australian rice still left in storage with at least another year to go before another rice crop could be planted and harvested, assuming the drought broke and water became available.

Import replacement, however, proved extremely challenging: climate disruptions were also affecting production in other rice-exporting nations, while Vietnam – a major international rice exporter – suspended all exports to ensure its own national food security during the Covid crisis.

The risks of increasingly relying on import replacement for food are heightened when Australia's population is projected to grow from 26 million in 2022 to at least 34.3 million by 2071.[29] National food security relies on supporting Australian farmers and Australian-based food manufacturers to remain profitable and competitive to supply food to this growing population and push back the tide of cheap food imports.

Instead, we appear to be heading in the opposite direction when a third of Australian vegetable growers are on the brink of exiting the industry due to lack of profitability.

A similar trend is evident in the Australian dairy industry, with annual milk production trending in a steady overall decline from 9239 million litres in 2014 to 8376 million litres in 2024.[30] Declining milk production and the profitability squeeze for farmers and dairy manufacturers were key factors in Australia ceasing to be a net cheese exporter to the world in 2024.[31]

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[28] Food imports hit $40 billion: local manufacturers struggle to compete, Weekly times, 10 December 2024, https://www.weeklytimesnow.com.au/news/food-imports-hit-40-billion-local-manufacturers-struggle-to-compete/news-story/8b65a9576f4361014f4918738ae67bc5#:~:text=News-,Food%20imports%20hit%20$40%20billion:%20local%20manufacturers%20struggle%20to%20compete,it%20was%20no%20longer%20feasible".

[29] Population Projections, Australia, ABS, https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/population-projections-australia/latest-release

[30] Annual Australian Dairy Industry In Focus reports, Dairy Australia, https://www.dairyaustralia.com.au/en/industry-reports/australian-dairy-industry-in-focus

[31] Australia no longer a net exporter of cheese, Weekly times, 6 May 2024, https://www.weeklytimesnow.com.au/dairy/australia-no-longer-a-net-exporter-of-cheese/news-

National Food Strategy discussion paper narrows the scope

The National Food Security Strategy discussion paper appears to deliberately narrow the scope of the development of the National Food Strategy by omission.

For example, it says 11 federal ministerial portfolios have a role influencing the food system and food outcomes and that the strategy will consider linkages to initiatives across government. However, the example list of initiatives is limited to food security for remote indigenous communities; preventative health; biosecurity; defence; net zero and Future Made in Australia.

This not-so-subtly frames the food security strategy's scope within these limits, and reinforces the framing in Section 3 where the whole-of-system considerations cover only climate change and sustainability; people (as in, vulnerable Australians without access to reliable, high-quality and affordable food); health and nutrition; trade and market access; and, national and regional security.

Whole-of-system must also mean whole-of-government. The discussion paper should have listed all 11 portfolios, and described all initiatives with a role or an impact on Australia's food system, including water, transport, planning, taxation and energy, to name only a few.

Otherwise we will continue down the current path with different ministers pursuing policies that are counterproductive to the stated objective of ensuring Australia's national food security. Water policy is a standout example.

Actions

Immediate/short term

1. Immediately cease all federal and State water recovery in the Murray-Darling Basin, including through rules changes, and instead invest that funding in addressing the degradation drivers[32] preventing the system-wide step-change in ecological health Australian taxpayers expect for this 20-year, $13 billion reform.
2. Government policies and regulations relevant to food security must be the fourth key priority area for the development of the National Food Security Strategy. This includes water policy.

story/87bcb9b82584578ac325dccb5b72387e#:~:text=The%20value%20of%20cheese%20imports,costs%20bite%20and%20imports%20surge.

[32] Beyond Buybacks: Why We Need to More Than Just Add Water, NSWIC, January 2023, https://mcusercontent.com/c6e5c2d75b14461767c095feb/files/a5b591bb-6d1a-9475-a5e5-119d75679d5d/2023_01_31_Beyond_buybacks_Campaign.pdf

3. Broaden the scope of the development of the National Food Security Strategy to include a stocktake and analysis of all initiatives and policies across all 11 portfolios with a role influencing the food system and food outcomes.
4. Develop the National Food Security Strategy using best practice co-design principles with community and industry.
5. Detail the actions to mitigate counterproductive government policies and initiatives that are undermining farmers' capacity to grow a reliable and affordable supply of food, and putting Australia's food processing sector at a competitive disadvantage against imports.

Medium term

1. Develop national projects to store more water in the wet years for drier years.
2. Review water management and pricing at federal and state level to ensure water is maximised for food production, particularly for resilience to climate shocks.
3. Expand and update ABARES data collection, including:
    a. Trends in annual volume of production by food type and location.
    b. Trends in area cultivated or grazed by commodity type and location.
    c. Profitability trends by commodity type broken down into deciles as per the broadacre graphic above on p9, and also by location.
    d. Gross Value and Production of Irrigated Agriculture by region and commodity.

Long-term

1. Explore innovative solutions to increase the volume of water stored for use by farmers during dry periods and drought. For example, 100%-plus allocations in very wet periods with on-farm storages to hold this water when available.

Conclusion

Water security is indeed crucial to balancing risks and opportunities enabling ongoing food availability for domestic consumption and exports.

However, reducing the water available to grow food in the southern Murray-Darling Basin by almost a third already has reduced Australia's capacity to ensure food security in the event of sudden shocks (e.g. an economic, health, conflict or climatic crisis) or cyclical events (e.g. seasonal food insecurity).

Current water policy settings do not contribute to either stability (i.e., affordable and diverse food production through extreme events such as drought) nor sustainability (current water policy does not support sustained food production, nor environmental sustainability when legal, physical and environmental constraints in river systems limit

best use of environmental water while little is invested in addressing major degradation drivers such as invasive European carp).

The Food Strategy discussion paper correctly says the complexity of the food system means that acting in one part of the system can have ramifications elsewhere, sometimes in unpredictable ways. So, it is essential that the scope of the National Food Security Strategy includes identifying counterproductive government policies across multiple portfolios.

Government policy is the greatest disruption to the secure and affordable supply of water as a critical input to the food system. Unlike economic, health, conflict or climatic crises, this threat is totally within government control.

We cannot continue with government policies and regulations that actively undermine Australian farmers and food processors capacity to deliver a safe, diverse, secure and affordable food supply to Australian households.

Murray Regional Strategy Group

The Murray Regional Strategy Group (MRSG) comprises industry, Indigenous, community organisations and irrigation groups in the NSW Murray Valley. Our organisation formed after the Member for Farrer Sussan Ley advised the 600 plus people attending a crisis meeting at the Deniliquin RSL in 2018, that we needed one voice on water issues.

Final Note

This submission from the Murray Regional Strategy Group was prepared by consultant Claire Miller and initiated by the Speak Up Campaign.

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